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Since the landmark To Err Is Human report,1 many studieshave shown that health care is often hazardous rather than
beneficial to patients, with unnecessary morbidity and mortal-
ity.2–4 However, similar contributing factors—complexity of the
work processes, organizational characteristics, and professional
autonomy4–6—can be found in other industries, some of which
have found good approaches to mitigate the factors’ effect on
safety and quality. Nuclear production, for example, is widely
recognized for its innovations in approaches to safety.7
Many authors have advocated the diffusion of innovations
from other high-risk industries into health care to improve safe-
ty.8–19
According to Rogers, an innovation is “an idea, practice, or
objective perceived as new by an individual, a group, or an
organization,” and diffusion is “the process in which an inno-
vation is communicated, through certain channels over time,
among the members of a social system.”20(p. 5) As Greenhalgh et
al. indicate, diffusion often is not a passive process but involves
negotiating, influencing, and a staff that can enable change and
“help it happen.”21 One example of an innovation diffused into
health care is the investigative tool of root cause analysis, which
emerged and spread through many industries, including
nuclear power, aviation, and chemical plants.12 Since 1995, The
Joint Commission has required that it used to identify the 
causes of errors and incidents.22  As another example, a children’s
hospital improved its intensive care unit handoff practice on
the basis of the Ferrari’s Formula 1TM races.13
The aviation industry is seen as comparable to health care
because of its similarities in (a) the use of technology, (b) the
requirement of highly specialized professional teams, and (c)
the existence of risk and uncertainties.6,8,15–19 It is the improve-
ment in safety that the aviation industry has been able to
achieve that has sparked special interest in health care. For
example, between 1994 and 2006, the average rate of fatal acci-
dents decreased from 0.05 to 0.022 per 100,000 departures,
which led Pronovost et al. to conclude “health care’s slow and
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Background: Many authors have advocated the diffusion
of innovations from other high-risk industries into health
care to improve safety. The aviation industry is comparable
to health care because of its similarities in (a) the use of
technology, (b) the requirement of highly specialized pro-
fessional teams, and (c) the existence of risk and uncertain-
ties. For almost 20 years, The Rotterdam Eye Hospital
(Rotterdam, the Netherlands) has been engaged in diffus-
ing several innovations adapted from aviation. 
Methods: A case-study methodology was used to assess
the application of innovations in the hospital, with a focus
on the context and the detailed mechanism for each inno-
vation. Data on hospital performance outcomes were
abstracted from the hospital information data management
system, quality and safety reports, and the incident report-
ing system. Information on the innovations was obtained
from a document search; observations; and semistructured,
face-to-face interviews.  
Innovations: Aviation industry–based innovations dif-
fused into patient care processes were as follows: patient
planning and booking system, taxi service/valet parking,
risk analysis (as applied to wrong-site surgery), time-out
procedure (also for wrong-site surgery), Crew Resource
Management training, and black box. Observations indi-
cated that the innovations had a positive effect on quality
and safety in the hospital: Waiting times were reduced,
work processes became more standardized, the number of
wrong-site surgeries decreased, and awareness of patient
safety was heightened. 
Conclusion: A near-20-year experience with aviation-
based innovation suggests that hospitals start with relative-
ly simple innovations and use a systematic approach toward
the goal of improving safety. 
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disappointing efforts to improve safety contrast with the
remarkable success of aviation safety.”23(p.480) As in aviation,
health care professionals have been urged to standardize work
processes, employ checklists to ensure that patients receive evi-
dence-based interventions consistently,24,25 and use robust, sci-
entific methods in collaborative efforts to identify and mitigate
risks.26,27 However, others have stressed the importance of learn-
ing from aviation’s safety culture instead of just copying individ-
ual methods or models.28–31
Sorra and Nieva, for example, have defined a safety culture
as follows:
The product of the individual and group values, attitudes,
perceptions, competencies and patterns of behavior that
determine the commitment to, and the style and proficien-
cy of an organization’s health and safety management.32
On the basis of selected literature,28–31 the following four
dimensions appear to be relevant in determining a safety cul-
ture: 
1. Mastery of risks (reporting errors, correction and analysis
of errors, learning from [near] airplane crashes)
2. Social orientation (curtailing operator autonomy while
preserving operator authority, increasing knowledge and skills
in cockpit communication and helping)
3. Awareness of risks (anticipation of weather conditions,
acceptance of human factors in safety)
4. Aversion to reporting errors (rigid focus on prevention,
transparency with respect to errors, not covering up near miss-
es during flights)
Comparing the safety culture in naval aviation and hospitals,
Singer et al. showed that the safety culture was three times bet-
ter on average among naval aviators than hospital personnel
and that naval aviators perceived a culture that was up to seven
times safer.33 The authors contended that health care systems
could benefit from adapting some of the structures, systems,
and practices that have proven effective in aviation. Yet, little is
known about how those practices are diffused in health care.
For almost 20 years, The Rotterdam Eye Hospital
(Rotterdam, the Netherlands) has been engaged in diffusing
several innovations from the aviation industry throughout the
organization, as we describe in this article. 
Methods
We used a case-study methodology to assess the application of
innovations in the hospital, with a focus on the context and the
detailed mechanism for each innovation.34 We adapted the
Greenhalgh et al. framework21 to analyze the diffusion of inno-
vations (Table 1, page 341). Data on hospital performance out-
comes were abstracted from the hospital information data man-
agement system, quality and safety reports, and the incident
reporting system (in which near-incidents [near misses or close
calls] are also reported. We [D.F.K., F.G.B.] carried out a doc-
ument search for senior and unit-level managers’ correspon-
dence (memos, letters, and e-mail), policy statements, and
annual reports. We also conducted observations of the care
practices, starting back in 1992 for the first innovation. In
addition, in 2009, guided by a topic list based on the
Greenhalgh et al. framework, we conducted 11 semistructured,
face-to-face interviews with key participants from medical,
nursing, and administrative staff, most of whom had worked in
the hospital since even before the start of the innovations. We
structured and analyzed content from the documents and the
interviews according to tags drawn from the diffusion of inno-
vations framework. 
A Focus on Aviation
SETTING
The Rotterdam Eye Hospital, founded in 1874, is the only eye
hospital in the Netherlands (population, 16 million), providing
secondary eye care for the region and tertiary eye care for the
whole country. As a major referral center, on a yearly basis it
handles approximately 140,000 outpatient visits and 14,000
surgery cases. Some 30 specialized ophthalmologists, 4 anesthe-
siologists, and 4 internists, not employed by the hospital, main-
tain their practices through a partnership within the hospital
organization. The hospital, which has 400 employees and oper-
ates resident and fellow programs and a research institute, is a
member of the American Association of Eye and Ear Centers of
Excellence and the founding member of the European and
World Association of Eye Hospitals. 
GETTING STARTED
In the early 1990s, the hospital was at risk of being taken
over by an academic hospital. The Dutch government allowed
it to remain a stand-alone hospital only if it was able to achieve
high production volumes, low costs, and a specific patient-
centered approach. In 1992, the hospital was providing high-
quality clinical care but had serious problems with patient
logistics, as seen for example, in long wait times. The hospital
decided to benchmark with aviation, given its accomplishments
in handling more passengers, improving logistics and safety,
and being service-oriented (as one senior manager described the
industry). The fact that the same CEO and chief financial offi-
cer have been in place since the decision to benchmark was
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made has facilitated the continuity in policy. The CEO
[U.F.H.]—a physician—played an important role in champi-
oning the program and in “selling it” to the medical staff. Many
of the physicians seemed to find aviation to provide an accept-
able model, which was useful in winning their involvement in
quality and safety programs. 
Innovations
For each of the six innovations, as shown in Figure 1 (page
342), we describe (a) the application, (b) the observed effects
on quality and safety, and (c) the facilitators and barriers.
Sidebars describing additional features and outcomes and other
aspects of the innovations are available in the online article.   
INNOVATION 1. PATIENT PLANNING AND BOOKING
SYSTEM (1992)
Application. The purpose of the patient planning and book-
ing (reservations) system, which was fully implemented by the
end of 1992, was to reduce delay and to realize a more efficient
system for patient logistics. The system was developed by care-
ful study of the reservations system used by Royal Dutch
Airlines (KLM). A KLM logistics expert worked in the hospital
for more than a year to help implement a comparable system.
The most important change was distinguishing central capaci-
ty management (master planning) from decentralized booking
of individual patient visits. A central logistics department was
introduced, which was responsible for master planning, includ-
ing balancing office visits and surgeries—so physicians were no
Feasibility of Changing 
Practice, Procedures, and Context
System A (Airline) System B (Hospital) of Hospital to Match Airline 
The innovation Salient features currently used Salient features of innovation Could and should System B adopt the
in System A? proposed for use in System B? same innovation as is used by System A?
The resources What resources were used in What resources in System B? Does System B have the resources to 
producing the outcomes emulate the practice of System A?
(e.g., staff time, money, 
equipment, space)? 
The people What are the salient characteristics What are the characteristics of the Insofar as there is a mismatch, would it be
of the key actors in terms of key actors in System B? desirable or feasible to recruit different 
expertise, experience, commitment? staff, invest in training, etc.?
Institutional factors How much were the outcomes To what extent does the  Differences? Feasible or desirable
dependent on organizational/ organizational structure and to change the institutional structures and 
departmental structure, culture of System B cultures in B?
organizational cultures? determine practice? 
Environmental How much were the outcomes To what extent is the external Differences? Change the external 
factors dependent on particular environment of System B environment of System B?
environmental factors comparable to System A? 
(e.g., political, legislative)?
Measures What baseline, process, outcome, Does (or could) System B use Desirable or feasible for System B to
and other measures were used the same measures? change the way it measures and records
to evaluate success? practice?
Procedures What was exactly done in System A Does (or could) System B do Differences? Should System B change what
that led to the outcomes reported? exactly the same? it does?
Outcomes What were the key outcomes, for What were the key outcomes in To what are the differences attributable? 
whom, at what cost, and what are System B? Achieve for same Desirable outcomes that System B is not
they attributable to? actors as System A? achieving? 
* Adapted from Greenhalgh T., et al.: Diffusion of Innovations in Health Service Organisations: A Systematic Literature Review. Malden, UK: Blackwell Publishing,
2005.
Table 1. Analysis Framework for Diffusion of Innovations*
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longer directly involved in planning and booking. 
The planning and booking system remain operational, and
software uses are being expanded to reduce manual labor.
Effects on Quality and Safety. The new planning system led
to a reduction of waiting time from an average of 12 (in the
early 1990s) to 4 weeks. The surgical productivity doubled, and
the number of office visits increased from less than 100,000 to
almost 140,000 patients per year, while the average capacity
remained unchanged (Table 2, page 343). Because of increasing
use of ambulatory surgery, the number of inpatient beds was
reduced. 
Facilitators and Barriers. Hospital staff were not able to dif-
fuse the innovation by themselves. In 1992, aviation logistics
experts introduced staff to the patient planning and booking
system and trained them on an adaptation of the software. One
of the challenges was that the information technology that sup-
ported the system in aviation was not available in the hospital.
The hospital had to develop a Microsoft® Excel®-based system,
which involved much manual work to operate, and the
required software did not become available until 2008. In addi-
tion, at the start the hospital had little logistic expertise and
therefore had to hire logistics experts and build their patient
logistics department from scratch.  
Although pilots are not involved in booking, physicians usu-
ally are, so introducing the system led to a loss of some auton-
omy for the physicians, who were no longer able to set their
own schedules. The physicians’ initial resistance lessened as
they experienced the benefits of the innovation, which includ-
ed far less administrative work—and more time for patient
care, resulting in increased revenue. As one ophthalmologist
remarked, “I am satisfied when I can spend my time on patient
care instead of other burdens.” Another ophthalmologist stat-
ed, “In this hospital, everything is organized around our spe-
cialty and therefore we can focus on quality and volume. In
other hospitals, ophthalmologists are usually low on the totem
pole when it comes to utilizing surgical rooms and technologi-
cal resources.” Thus, although the planning system was partly
copied from aviation, the implementation process was not. The
master planning system and the compartmentalized booking
departments are still operational today.  
INNOVATION 2. TAXI SERVICE (2006)/VALET PARKING
(2008)
Application. Because of the hospital’s inner-city location and
the fact that more than 50% of the patients commuted from
the surrounding counties, parking problems were endemic.
Patients often were late for appointments, stressed, and dissat-
isfied with the overall travel experience. The hospital, inspired
by airport shuttles, implemented a taxi service to bring patients
to the hospital. In collaboration with a health travel provider,
the hospital began a cataract taxi service (“cat cab”) in 2006.
The service was cancelled the following year, however, because
of  lack of financing. The hospital then contracted with a pri-
vate valet parking service in 2008, which remains in operation
and almost breaks even now.
Effects on Quality and Safety. The taxi delivery can be
viewed as addressing service and quality. Cataract surgery is
usually performed under local anesthesia, so that a low stress
level for patients is important. No evidence exists, however, that
the taxi service or valet parking led to a reduction in patients’
preoperative anxiety. Patients were satisfied with the taxi service
concept, even when paying out of pocket. A satisfaction survey
Figure 1. The six innovations adapted from aviation at The Rotterdam Eye Hospital are shown, with parallel patient and traveler processes. CRM, Crew
Resource Management.
Time Line of Six Innovations Adapted from Aviation at The Rotterdam Eye Hospital,
1992–2009
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showed that for 114 patients, 91% found it more convenient
than public transportation, and 87% agreed that they arrived
more relaxed in the hospital. Valet parking, common in the
United States, has since been used by an increasing number of
patients at the hospital, the first in the Netherlands to provide
such a service. 
Facilitators and Barriers. The hospital administration was
able to diffuse the service themselves by contracting with exter-
nal parties. It sought a less expensive alternative to taxi service,
however, after the health insurers were no longer willing to
reimburse the costs. The hospital co-financed valet parking by
asking for a small contribution from patients and drawing on
innovation funds. 
INNOVATION 3. RISK ANALYSIS (2004)
Application. Wrong-site surgery, one of the worst types of
patient harm that can occur in any hospital,35 was occurring an
average of five to six times a year at the hospital (Table 2). To
eliminate adverse events, especially wrong-site surgeries, the
hospital introduced Toyota Production System (TPS) Lean Six
Sigma risk management, a methodology broadly applied in avi-
ation and other industries.36 Multidisciplinary risk management
teams of physicians, residents, nurses, administrators, and qual-
ity executives (five to eight participants each) pursued risk
analysis, in which they analyzed critical processes in the hospi-
tal and used the methodology to identify risks and propose
improvements. Risk management experts were hired to assist in
five training sessions for each team to train the staff in using the
methodology. On the aviation safety experts’ advice, the
methodology was adapted to the hospital setting, given its less
intense focus on safety. For example, the time frame for con-
ducting root cause analyses was shortened.
When reporting incidents and near-incidents, health care
professionals are asked to assess risks on the basis of estimated
frequencies and severity. Beginning in 2006, the hospital began
using the risk-analysis method in developing clinical pathways,
and since 2009 it has applied the method to its safety reporting
management system. 
In 2009, a digital safety-reporting management system was
introduced, and three safety committees (surgery, outpatient,
facilities and administration) each performs one risk analysis
per quarter. Incident reporters are asked to estimate the risk
based on frequency and severity for every incident or near-
incident. Starting in 2010, internal quality audits have focused
on processes instead of on individual departments.
Effects on Quality and Safety. The risk-analysis method
helped to identify critical gaps in various processes and stimu-
lated the introduction of checks during patient intake and
screening in the wards and recovery rooms. The majority of the
identified risks were related to human factors, such as ophthal-
mologists’ late arrival and their and other staff members’ illegi-
ble handwriting and communication failures. The actions
reduced but not eliminate wrong-site surgeries (Table 2).
Facilitators and Barriers. There was no “risk management
culture” in the hospital, according to the aviation safety experts,
because when protocols are set in place professionals are not
held accountable and do not feel obliged to follow them. 
Also, the experts felt that the full range of factors contribut-
Initial Total Wrong-Site Reported Near-*
Office Office Full-Time Sentinel Wrong-Site
Year Surgeries Visits Visits Faculty Residents Support Staff Beds Events Incidents
1992 6,734 46,864 97,010 23 14 207 65 4 1
1994 7,340 49,208 101,861 24 14 204 61 5 2
1996 8,515 51,557 106,723 23 14 206 50 6 1
1998 9,537 56,507 116,969 24 11 205 28 5 0
2000 9,701 58,982 118,197 22 9 200 13 6 1
2001 9,955 58,104 123,352 23 10 208 11 8 1
2002 10,328 59,469 124,998 27 13 200 9 6 2
2003 10,428 58,379 123,748 25 14 207 9 3 5
2004 11,199 58,394 119,143 26 16 213 9 0 4
2005 11,864 62,008 141,433 26 18 259 9 1 5
2006 12,692 64,698 139,981 27 20 285 8 0 7
2007 12,610 65,343 137,525 27 20 268 8 0 3
2008 13,338 66,315 136,754 29 21 282 7 1 8
2009 13,242 64,532 134,163 29 19 273 7 1 9
* Near-, near miss or close call.
Table 2. Quality and Safety Statistics, The Rotterdam Eye Hospital, 1992–2009
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ing to wrong-site surgery may not be fully understood and that
staff might not always comply with intraoperative interventions
to prevent wrong-site surgery.  
Yet the process-based approach for risk management was
received with enthusiasm by the medical staff and other staff,
primarily because it was practical and directly related to every-
day routines and largely perceived as effective. As one ophthal-
mologic resident stated, “It is really useful to visualize your
work from a bird’s-eye perspective and to see what kind of
things people are doing before and after you.”  
One of the experts stated, “When I compare the situation in
the operating room to the cockpit, it seems as if I go back 30
years in aviation history.” Physicians, for example, have much
more leeway in terms of using guidelines and procedures than
pilots. The hospital also lacks the aviation industry’s strict sys-
tem of registration and accountability for cases in which checks
are not performed. 
INNOVATION 4. TIME-OUT PROCEDURE (2004)
Application. Continuing the attempt to eliminate wrong-
site surgeries, in 2004 the hospital introduced another innova-
tion from aviation, a “time-out” procedure. Immediately before
surgery and with all members of the surgical team present, a
final check is conducted using a standardized (open) question-
naire to ensure that the surgery being performed is on the right
patient and on the intended side.37 The time-out procedure
includes a check of the required materials (for example, intraoc-
ular [implant] lens, donor cornea) and the patient’s health sta-
tus with respect to the planned surgical procedure, comparable
with aviation’s flight plan before takeoff. The procedure is in
addition to the normal preparatory checks and is documented
in an anesthesia data system. 
Effects on Quality and Safety. Time-out was introduced
after the occurrence of a number of (near-) wrong-site surgeries
despite safety checks earlier in the process. Since its introduc-
tion in 2004, the number of wrong-site surgeries has dramati-
cally decreased, while more near-incidents were reported (Table
2). One ophthalmologist stated, “The simplicity of the proto-
col, the involvement of staff during implementation, and the
fast, clear results were eye-opening. It should be a rule always
and everywhere to start surgery with a time-out.” The time-out
procedure, however, was not used during all surgeries. For the
wrong-site incidents that occurred in 2005, 2008, and 2009,
analysis revealed that the time-out procedure was not per-
formed or not performed correctly. 
Facilitators and Barriers. The hospital was able to diffuse
this innovation without the help of aviation safety experts. In
the aviation version of the time-out procedure, the entire flight
crew follows the final checklist with all relevant parameters
immediately before departure. Each team member is asked cer-
tain questions to ensure total participation and dissemination of
relevant information. The hospital copied the concept but used
its own content, drawing on the Universal Protocol for Pre vent -
ing Wrong Site, Wrong Procedure, Wrong Person Surgery.™35
Representatives from the medical staff were involved in both
the design and implementation of the time-out procedure. Yet,
again because physicians traditionally have more autonomy, the
safety procedure was not used regularly. Although most of the
physicians followed the procedure without fail, others did not
use the procedure at the outset, while others used it only when
not pressed for time. The hierarchy in health care, which is
stronger than in aviation and other industries, led us to assign
responsibility for the procedure to the ophthalmologists, but
the same hierarchy discouraged others from confronting oph-
thalmologists who did not carry out the procedure. For the
medical and surgery staff, using checklists was first primarily
viewed as a time-consuming activity without clear benefit. Yet,
ophthalmologists’ compliance improved when it became
known that no wrong-site surgeries had occurred when the pro-
cedure was used and after the hospital received recognition in
2004 in the form of the Golden Helix Award.38 One ophthal-
mologist commented, “The fact that we were used as an exam-
ple has greatly encouraged me to take the time-out seriously.”
As stated, the goal of ophthalmologists’ 100% compliance
remains unmet. For example, registration as documented in the
anesthesia data management system showed a noncompliance
of 2%, while the surgical department expected underreporting
and nonreporting of incorrectly or incompletely conducted
time-out procedures. Greater understanding of staff ’s percep-
tion of and barriers to complying with time-out may improve
compliance and facilitate the design of more effective and effi-
cient procedures. 
INNOVATION 5. CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
(2007)
Application. To improve teamwork, safety awareness, and
compliance with the time-out procedure, the hospital diffused a
fifth innovation from aviation, Crew Resource Management
(CRM), a safety training program that is mandatory for airline
pilots worldwide. Five aviation safety experts with experience in
training flight crews led hospital staff in adapting CRM training
as used in aviation to the medical context and, in pairs, taught
the program to multidisciplinary medical teams. The four-hour
sessions were as follows (see Sidebar 5 in online article): 
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1. Session 1 consisted of a presentation and discussion of the
context of patient safety (human factors) and the consequences
and necessary tools of teamwork (communication). 
2. Session 2 elaborated on the theory and practice of the core
notions of situational awareness for risk situations and decision
making, with discussion of causes and appropriate reactions to
faults and (un)acceptable risks. 
3. Session 3 addressed personality and (non)functional be -
havior in relation to patient safety. Leadership and the impor-
tance of accountability were important themes. Participants
were asked to openly discuss their personal experiences with
safety issues. 
4. Session 4 took place in a Boeing 737-800 flight simulator,
an environment in which the trainees had to use their newly
learned skills without being able to fall back on their profes-
sional technical skills. The simulator was also used as an incen-
tive for physicians to become involved in the training. 
The training was mandatory for everyone but physicians,
70% of whom participated; starting in 2009, participation was
made mandatory for all residents, nurses, managers, and oph-
thalmologists physicians (as agreed by management and med-
ical staff ). The hospital provides CRM training for current and
new staff on an ongoing basis, and since 2009, it has extended
the training to outpatient-clinic teams. Efforts are being made
to investigate the effect of the training in terms of incident
reporting and patient outcomes and to use feedback from staff
to develop training that best meets their needs.  
Effects on Quality and Safety. There is no evidence that oph-
thalmologists’ compliance with the time-out procedure has
improved since the CRM training was provided. Yet, positive
feedback on the training has been provided. For example, one
of the ophthalmologists stated, “Yesterday I had to perform a
complex lamellar keratoplasty surgery. I have the different
stages of the surgery written down and always study it before-
hand. I often thought about taking these notes with me, but I
was afraid of losing face—I am an experienced surgeon and I
should be able to do this! The safety training showed me the
importance of showing your doubts and vulnerabilities. Ever
since, I have taken my notes with me. It feels like a victory.”    
Facilitators and Barriers. As stated, in contrast to the
mandatory participation in the training program in aviation,
the hospital’s management was not initially able to require oph-
thalmologists to participate. The aviation safety experts who
provided the training were viewed as credible by the partici-
pants, given the comparability between aviation and health
care—and the cockpit and the operating room—as well as the
fact that they did not occupy positions in medical hierarchy.
One nurse commented, “You take him seriously because he’s an
expert from aviation, and he therefore is also able to approach
all the participants in the training—doctors and nurses—as if
they were on the same level.” 
INNOVATION 6. BLACK BOX (2008)
Application. To stimulate further the use of safety manage-
ment principles, the hospital introduced a sixth innovation
inspired by aviation’s “black box,” which by recording all flight
crew activities is used to determine the cause(s) of an accident.
In adopting the innovation, the hospital recorded surgical team
activities. The aviation safety experts videotaped several oph-
thalmologic surgeries, which were provided to give the team
feedback on the application of the safety procedures that were
taught during CRM. Adherence to protocols for the produc-
tion, use, and distribution of the images (which are not part of
the medical record) was documented. 
Effects on Quality and Safety. The video recordings revealed
team-specific differences in performing the time-out procedure
and in use of the safety communication rules agreed on during
the CRM training; they also showed that the absence of team
members at the preoperative briefing resulted in less structure
and some communication lapses during the surgery. As one of
the aviation safety experts, who had provided CRM training,
said, “It is a new and inspiring experience for ophthalmologists
to see their own performance . . . within their environment. It
confirms the notion that surgery is a team activity.” Video
images showed the importance of teamwork; it is difficult to
deny teamwork failures when they are clearly shown on tape.
Facilitators and Barriers. While the black box used for
recording in-flight images and voices is automated, because of
financial constraints the hospital used the somewhat more
intrusive handheld videorecorder. The medical staff were ini-
tially hesitant to participate, fearing that recorded unexpected
outcomes could be used against them. Only ophthalmologists
who participated in the CRM program, who knew and trusted
the aviation safety experts, consented to have their surgeries
vidorecorded, and only if the images were used solely for 
their own training. The ophthalmologist-in-chief, who declared
his willingness two months into the program to make the
recordings available to all the hospital’s attendings, residents,
and nurses, along with attracting media attention
(http://nos.nl/video/32459-chirurgen-gaan-samenwerken-met-
piloten.html) stimulated others to get involved in the program.
The hospital is seeking funding to develop a continuous, auto-
mated videorecording system for all surgeries and is expecting a
decision soon on whether the Health Care Inspectorate (IGZ;
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http://www.igz.nl/ english/) will develop legislation concerning
the production and use of such recordings. 
Discussion
None of the six innovations from the aviation industry that
have been diffused in patient care processes at The Rotterdam
Eye Hospital since 1992 could be exactly replicated—all need-
ed to be adapted for use in health care. The taxi service and the
black box concept were inspired by the aviation industry, but
their deployment and purpose were altered. The remaining
innovations used the same principles for similar purposes, but
with different content.
Observations indicated that the innovations had a positive
effect on quality and safety in the hospital: waiting times were
reduced, work processes became more standardized, the num-
ber of wrong-site surgeries decreased, and awareness of patient
safety was heightened. In general, the health care professionals
at the hospital were interested in participating in the innova-
tions, especially when aviation safety experts were directly
involved in implementing them. There were also indications
that they talked more openly about their safety concerns and
the risks and ways to counteract them. Yet, in the absence of
validated measures and an experimental design, the article is
limited to a description of the innovations and lacks systemat-
ic evidence for their effectiveness.
Together, the six innovations addressed the four dimensions
of safety culture previously cited—mastery of risks, social orien-
tation, awareness of risks, and aversion to reporting errors.29–31
The interviews showed that the ophthalmologists and other
hospital staff became increasingly aware of safety issues because
of the interventions. Innovation 3 (risk-analysis method) and
Innovation 4 (time-out procedure), which were used to prevent,
correct, and analyze errors, particularly addressed the mastery of
risks within (surgical) processes. For both innovations, the mul-
tidisciplinary approach was experienced as a change from a
functionally oriented culture. As Tal and Lichtenfeld have
recently shown, health care’s learning from aviation is primarily
not about borrowing methods but rather is about changing pro-
fessional and organizational culture.39
Innovation 5 (CRM training) and Innovation 6 (black box)
seemed to promote social (team) orientation and risk awareness
and to discourage aversion to reporting. Feedback based on
videorecording, as described in Innovation 6, appeared to
address all four safety-culture dimensions. The efforts to over-
come staff ’s hesitation to participate in videorecording reflect
the importance of trust in the process of a culture change. Yet,
data regarding the effects of the innovations on safety culture
are not available; only in 2007, after the first four innovations
had already been implemented, was a hospitalwide survey, the
Error Culture Questionnaire,28 distributed. The survey was
again recently distributed; results are pending. 
The study also showed that a number of barriers have to be
overcome for successful diffusion of innovations from aviation
or indeed other industries. Health care financial resources are
often limited or earmarked for specific purposes. Many of the
innovations required new sources of funding, for example, for
hiring senior people from aviation to serve as experts, often for
extended periods. It is unclear how such infrastructure invest-
ments should be financed in health care. Because aviation is
also a much more forward-looking industry when it comes to
the use of information technology, virtually any innovations are
likely to operate less efficiently in health care.
As stated, professional autonomy is more deeply entrenched
in health care (physicians) than in aviation (pilots), so it is all
the more important that physician “champions” are actively
involved in diffusing the innovation.40 In aviation, safety has
been high on the agenda for decades, and a coherent safety sys-
tem evolved in the form of a structured and supporting culture
in which there are few degrees of freedom in following safety
guidelines, regulations, and procedures. The issue of the rela-
tionship between physicians’ sense of professionalism and a
safety culture is outside the scope of this article, but attempts to
diffuse innovations from aviation or another industry into
health care may be more likely to contribute to a safety culture
when a series of innovations are pursued, as was the case at The
Rotterdam Eye Hospital. In addition, the fact that the hospital
has had almost all the same board members since 1992 has con-
solidated the hospital’s long-term commitment to these innova-
tions. However, we believe that the findings are relevant to
other hospitals, which as reflected in many of the facilitators
and barriers associated with the innovations, share the high
risks, limited resources, and highly educated professionals
found in health care.
Conclusion
On the basis of a near-20-year experience with aviation-based
innovation, we recommend that hospitals start with relatively
simple innovations and use a systematic approach toward the
goal of improving safety. Budgeting adequate resources for
implementation of innovation may itself require innovation. 
This article was adapted from a paper, “Flying with Doctors: Experiences with the
Application of Six Techniques from Aviation Industry in the Rotterdam Eye
Hospital,” presented at the Healthcare Systems Ergonomics and Patient Safety
Conference, Jun. 25, 2008, Strasbourg, France. http://www.heps2008.org/
abstract/data/pdf/dekorne.pdf (last accessed Jun. 21, 2010).
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Features
■ Implementation of a department for patient logistics and a central scheduling system for office visits and surgery
■ Training of department staff by aviation logistic experts in using central master planning and booking software. Time for both surgery and
office visits for all procedures and ophthalmologists was strictly blocked one year ahead in two blocks per day (master planning). For less
predictable and more complicated retina and orbital surgery, whole days were blocked.
■ Booking staff working at the department level were responsible for booking patients in the agreed time slots. The slots were opened gradu-
ally, e.g., 20% of the capacity was available 5 months before surgery, 60% 2 months before, and 100% 2 weeks before. This system allowed
for scheduling of medically urgent cases.      
■ In 1992, the central planning department introduced overbooking as a method for capacity management at the clinics. The decentralized
bookers were allowed to book a few patients extra per clinic to anticipate possible no-shows. Also, a flexible number of available ophthalmic
residents were used for capacity management.
■ Physicians had to give notice of elective absence at least 3 months before date. 
Outcomes
■ The surgical productivity doubled, and the number of office visits increased from 97,010 to 134,163 patients per year, while the average
capacity remained almost unchanged. 
■ The waiting times were reduced from more than 12 weeks in the early 1990s (as reported by two staff persons interviewed) to 2 weeks in
2009. However, the hospital did not systematically measure and report wait times in the 1990s. The available data show an average waiting
time of 13.8 weeks in 2000 and 4.7 weeks in 2009 (ambulatory surgery, 6.6 weeks; inpatient surgery, 2.9 weeks).  
■ Because of increases in ambulatory surgery, the number of inpatient beds was reduced from 65 beds in 1992 to 7 beds in 2009.
■ The increasing number of patients resulted in an increase of revenues for both ophthalmologists and the hospital. 
Sidebar 1. Patient Planning and Booking System (1992)
Features
■ Taxi service (in 2006) for cataract patients was provided by an external company in close cooperation with the surgical department. 
■ Valet service (in 2008) for all patients and visitors was provided by an external company, in close cooperation with the front desk of the
hospital. 
Outcomes
A survey done in 2006 showed that patients appreciated the taxi service; 91% of 114 respondents, given the survey after cataract surgery,
agreed that this service was more convenient than public transport.  
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Data source: Hospital Management Information System / Annual Reports. Surgeries include all inpatient and outpatient oph-
thalmic surgical procedures. The hospital had 120 licensed beds until 1999 and 100 licensed beds from 2000 through 2009.   
Sidebar 2. Taxi Service (2006)/Valet Parking (2008)
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Features
■ For each multidisciplinary risk management team, five one-hour sessions were organized in which critical processes were analyzed using
Toyota Production System Lean Six Sigma management techniques. First, process flow charts were created and examined to identify fail-
ures, their root causes and relationships with other process steps, and possible consequences. Second, risk factors (R) were identified, using
the product of frequency (F) and the severity (S) for every possibly weak process step. Finally, improvement methods were determined, using
the R-value for prioritizing; responsibilities were indicated; and the results were reported and evaluated.
Outcomes
■ Wrong-site surgery was identified as one of the most important risks; therefore, critical checks were introduced into the preoperative
process. However, elimination of wrong-site surgeries (the primary goal) was not achieved. 
■ The majority of determined risks were related to human factors—errors, nonpunctuality, unclear written reporting, and communication fail-
ures between co-workers and with patients.  
Sidebar 3. Risk Management (2002)
Examples of Determined Risks and Actions Perioperative Process of Eye Surgery
Subprocess Failure Root Causes Consequence F S R Improvement Action 
Diagnosis and Not readable Bad handwriting Misinterpretation OD/OS 2 7 14 None
completion of (left or right eye)
surgery form
Preoperative Incorrect or insufficient Communication Stop of procedure, 2 9 18 1. Responsibilities are
check of preoperative report errors (language/ consult ophthalmologist documented. 
anesthesiologist, rational level/patient or: wrong eye is 2. Focus on 
retro bulbar pre assumed surgery injected (corrective) behavior.
injection or at other eye) 3. In case of confusion,
total anesthesia always stop procedure.
Ophthalmologist Reading failure/ 1. Communication Stop of procedure 2 10 20 1. Instruct on 
checks communication error obstacle (language/ or: wrong eye responsibilities and 
presurgical rational level/ is wrapped up necessary complete
plan and patient hypothesized check.
wraps up other eye) 2. Focus on behavior.
the eye 2. Slovenliness 3. Discuss outcomes of
3. Only medical risk analysis with whole
chart is screened  medical staff.
4. Medical chart is
checked again at surgery
by surgeon.
5. Surgical nurse puts
chart in front of surgeon.  
Surgery on eye Surgery on wrong eye Multiple (see causes Wrong-site surgery 2 10 20 See actions mentioned 
mentioned) before.
R (risk) = Frequency (F) x Severity (S). F and S are each rated on a 0–10 scale (F:  0 = Impossible, 10 = For sure; S: 0 = No problem, 10 = Catastrophic).
The minimum estimated risk value of 15 was agreed as starting point for improvement actions.
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Features
■ Immediately before surgery and with all members of the surgical team present, a final check is conducted using a standardized (open)
questionnaire to ensure that the surgery is being performed on the right patient and on the intended side. 
■ The time-out procedure includes a check of the required materials (e.g., intraocular [implant] lens, donor cornea, and so on) and the
patient’s health status with respect to the planned surgical procedure. 
■ The procedure was an addition to the normal preparatory checks (e.g., time-out with anesthetic team before delivery of anesthesia) and is
documented in an anesthesia data system. 
Outcomes
■ Wrong-site surgeries have decreased from an average of five a year before 2004 to zero in 2004, 2006, and 2007, while the number of 
surgeries has increased.
■ In 2005, 2008, and 2009 one wrong-site incident a year has occurred.
■ More identified near incidents were reported.
Sidebar 4. Time-Out Protocol (2004)
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Features
■ All multidisciplinary surgical teams (ophthalmologists, anesthesiologists, residents, [surgical] nurses, management) were trained 
(with 10–15 participating in one training program) in Crew Resource Management (CRM).
■ The program consisted of  four sessions of four hours each, led by an aviation safety expert.
■ The first three sessions were classroom-based, interactive, and focused on the organization, the team, and the individual, respectively.
The fourth session took place in a flight simulator (see table, below).
Outcomes
■ Participants indicated that the training promoted their risk awareness, teamwork, 
and cooperation.
■ In addition to the time-out procedure, a (de)briefing was implemented.
■ A “safety eye” (right) was developed as a tool to determine risks and to stimulate 
professionals to “speak up” during surgery. One nurse stated, “We sometimes just 
say to each other, ‘almost yellow,’ to signal that we have to change the current 
direction.” 
Source: Rotterdam Eye Hospital.  
Sidebar 5. Crew Resource Management (2007)
Training Program for Crew Resource Management 
Session Content 
Session 1: Organization Introduction to CRM 
Statistics and examples of human factor failures
Primary causes of incidents 
Recognizing errors using human factors theory and SHEL-Model (software, hardware, environment, lifeware)*
Threat and error management
Swiss cheese model and actions to reduce the likelihood of error†
Information processing
Situational awareness in decision making (part 1)
Session 2: Team Situational awareness in decision making (part 2)
Effective communication and coordination
CRM loop: inquiry →  advocacy  →  conflict resolution → decision making 
Leadership and teamwork 
Situational leadership
Relation- and task-focused
Feedback: push and pull styles
Push and pull styles of communication for leaders
Team exercises
Personality and  behavior (part 1)
Session 3: Individual Personality and behavior (part 2)
Hazardous attitudes 
How to beat hazardous attitudes
Personality  
Feedback: theory and exercises 
Session 4: Flight Simulator Relation and application of lessons learned, in an external, exciting environment without the usual roles and
hierarchy
Use of a Boeing 737-800 flight simulator: “Pilots Get Food Poisoning”: Ophthalmologists and nurses have to
prepare for landing, cooperate, and practice tools learned.    
* Edwards E.: Man and machine: Systems for safety. In Proceeding of British Airline Pilots Associations Technical Symposium. London: British Airline Pilots
Associations, 1972, pp. 21–36. 
† Reason J.: Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing
Limited, 1997.
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Tool
■ For every quarter since 2008, a full day of surgery has been videotaped with a handheld videorecorder. 
■ The tapes are analyzed by an aviation expert, and the most useful parts were used in a feedback session for the surgical team. All feed-
back is given by the aviation expert, who does not fingerpoint but provides examples of aviation practices. 
■ If the surgical team consented, a selection of the video images and the related feedback was provided with others during a medical staff
meeting (see table below). 
Outcomes
■ The video recordings have revealed team-specific differences in performing the time-out procedure and in use of the safety communica-
tion rules agreed on during the CRM training; they have also showed that the absence of team members at the preoperative briefing results
in less structure and some communication lapses during surgery. 
Sidebar 6. Black Box (2008)
Examples of Video Observations and Feedback to Multidisciplinary Team
Item Observation Feedback 
Mental preparation Before the patient was on the operating table, it The performing surgeon is not able to prepare mentally
was not yet agreed who (attending or resident) was and obtain situational awareness.
supposed to perform the surgery. 
Briefing After the patient arrived in the operating room, A “captain” needs to have the situational awareness 
a resident and student received a medical-technical regarding the competences of his colleague performing the
explanation about the procedure. There was no operation. To prevent such errors, he or she briefs him before 
talk about who would be performing what actions as to what to expect, so the situational awareness of the
or potential problems. As it turned out, the resident “copilot” is updated. The copilot can ask questions or
was asked to jump in during the surgery and was not make things clear to the whole team. 
prepared to do so. 
Projection The ophthalmologists discussed the surgery schedule for This is a good example of correct projection of tasks 
the day and indicated that the first surgery in the afternoon  and managing of resources.
was expected to take 2.5 hours. He asked the team to 
plan their lunch time accordingly. 
Time-Out The time-out was performed, but there was no How can we ensure that the time-out procedure is 
check against the information in the medical chart. performed in a standardized manner?
New Tip Halfway during surgery, a scalpel with new tip was The fact that surgeons did not know about the new tip can be
on the surgery table. The surgeons did not know why. observed as a “threat” from the organization. Are the communi-
cation procedures from the organization to surgeons sufficient,
and did the team take responsibility and sufficient measures to
prevent errors from such threats?
Communication The surgeon asks for an intraocular lens (IOL) , When the IOL is unpacked, it was shown to be the wrong
and the circulating nurse gets one. Before putting it on one. Why not close the communication loop before 
the surgery table, she says “20”  but did not receive a unpacking the IOL or implement a check moment before?
response from the surgeon. After a while, the surgeon 
asks to see the chart to check the IOL power.
Communication Frequently, a task or some material is required, but Communication possibilities at the surgery are limited 
is not repeated in a standardized manner to confirm (e.g., covered face, working hands, not looking at each
that it is understood.  other), which every team member should be aware of and try
to compensate for. Closing the communication loop during
handovers (repeating an assignment, saying “check” or “yes”)
seems to be useful.   
Assertiveness As the ophthalmologist prepared to wash the eye, The circulating nurse’s assertiveness was perfect, as 
the circulating nurse asks if the right method and was the reaction of the ophthalmologist.
material were used. 
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